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Conﬂicts of interest between the community and its members are
at the core of human social dilemmas. If observed selﬁshness has
future costs, individuals may hide selﬁsh acts but display altruistic
ones, and peers aim at identifying the most selﬁsh persons to avoid
them as future social partners. An interaction involving hiding and
seeking informationmay be inevitable. We staged an experimental
social-dilemma game in which actors could pay to conceal in-
formation about their contribution, giving, and punishing decisions
from an observer who selects her future social partners from the
actors. The observer could pay to conceal her observation of the
actors. We found sophisticated dynamic strategies on either side.
Actors hide their severe punishment and low contributions but
display high contributions. Observers select high contributors as
social partners; remarkably, punishment behavior seems irrelevant
for qualifying as a social partner. That actors nonetheless pay to
conceal their severe punishment adds a further puzzle to the role of
punishment in human social behavior. Competition between hiding
and seeking information about social behavior may be even more
relevant and elaborate in the real world but usually is hidden from
our eyes.
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What is the beneﬁt of watching someone? Observing a per-son’s behavior in a social dilemma may provide informa-
tion about her qualities as a social partner for potential collab-
oration in the future: Does she contribute to a public good? Does
she punish free riders? Does she reward contributors? Do I want
to collaborate with her? Direct observation is more reliable than
trusting gossip (1). Being watched, however, is not neutral: An
individual’s behavior may change in the presence of an observer
(the “audience effect”), and the observed may be tempted to
behave as expected to manage her reputation (2). Watchful eyes
may induce altruistic behavior in the observed (refs. 3–7 but also
see ref. 8). Even a mechanistic origin of recognizing watchful
eyes in the brain has been described as cortical orienting circuits
that mediate nuanced and context-dependent social attention
(9, 10). However, watching also may induce an “arms race” of
signals between observers and the observed. The observer should
take into account that the behavior of the observed may change
in response to observation and therefore should conceal her
watching; the observed should be very alert to faint signals of
being watched but should avoid any sign of having recognized that
watching is occurring (11). The interaction between observing
and being observed has implications for the large body of recent
research on human altruism (12–22). Especially when a conﬂict of
interest exists between observers and observed, they may use
a rich toolbox of sophisticated strategies both to manipulate sig-
nals and to uncover manipulations. This kind of strategic inter-
action may be ubiquitous but clandestine, so that it generally has
escaped attention. With human volunteers we staged an experi-
mental social-dilemma game containing a number of important
ingredients of real social interactions [e.g., choice of partners
(23)]: An observer selects her partners for a follow-up game, and
the observed players have a potential conﬂict between qualifying
for that follow-up game and competing successfully in the pres-
ent game. We offered both parties opportunities for deciding to
observe/not observe or allow/not allow observation, respectively;
if the observer chose to observe, she could opt for open or con-
cealed observation. We offered these choices with and without
providing information about the adopted strategy.
In the game, groups of ﬁve participants play two blocks of 15
rounds each. For the ﬁrst block, one of the ﬁve participants is
chosen randomly as the observer, and the other four participants
are the players in a social-dilemma game. The observer in the ﬁrst
block becomes one of the players in the second block. At the end
of the ﬁrst block, the ﬁrst-block observer may determine the sec-
ond block’s coplayers or opt for a random decision. Actively
choosing the second-block players incurs a small cost to the ﬁrst-
round observer. The player not chosen becomes the observer in
the second block.
The experiment consists of three games, each played by eight
independent groups. In the simple public goods (SPG) game,
four players play a public goods game in each round. From his
initial endowment of 10 points, each player can contribute 0, 5,
or 10 points to the public good. The rest is kept for his private
account. The round’s total contribution is doubled and redis-
tributed evenly among the four players. In the public goods game
with punishment possibility (PG&PUN), the public goods pro-
vision is followed by a punishment stage in which each player
may assign a punishment point to each of the other three players
after being informed about individual contributions. A punish-
ment point deducts one point from the punisher’s account and
three points from the account of the punished player. In the
public goods game followed by an indirect reciprocity game
(PG&IR), each round of the public goods game is followed by
a “give” phase in which each player is both a potential donor to
another player after being informed about the last contribution
and former “give” decisions of his receiver and a potential re-
ceiver from yet another player. Points given are tripled for the
receiver. In each phase (contribution, punishment, and give,
respectively) the observer may choose to observe up to two
players. Observing does not entail visual contact of observer and
player; instead the observer is informed about the player’s de-
cision and may remember the decision by the player’s identiﬁ-
cation number. The decisions of nonobserved players remain
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unknown to the observer. At a small cost, a player can hide his
decision (i.e., “close his window”) from the observer, who, at
a small cost, can conceal her decision to watch. When a player’s
“window is open,” the player is informed when he is observed.
However, he cannot distinguish between not being observed and
being the subject of concealed observation. The observer may
ﬁnd that the window of a player that she decided to observe is
closed and therefore be unable to obtain the information she
seeks (see Fig. 1 and SI Methods for details).
What are the expectations in this game? Suppose all actors
maximize their monetary gains, and this strategy is common
knowledge. In that case, the observer would opt for a random
selection of her coplayers in the second block, because all players
use their dominant strategy of free-riding in the second block,
and there are no differences among the potential coplayers.
Because active selection incurs a cost, a money-maximizing ob-
server would never choose this option. Without an active selec-
tion for the second block, players do not have any incentives to
display cooperativeness in the ﬁrst block and thus also use their
dominant strategy of free-riding in the ﬁrst block. Because both
closing the window and concealed observation incur costs but do
not create any money-maximizing beneﬁts when all players are
using money-maximizing strategies, these options are not used.
Analogously, costly punishment and costly giving are not used.
Predictions change, however, if we relax the assumption that
all participants are using money-maximizing strategies and as-
sume, as a small probability that some players are altruistic (24).
Observers may try to ﬁnd out who the altruistic players are, so as
to include them in the second block. To obtain this information,
it may be proﬁtable to use the costly option of concealed ob-
servation. Because being a player in the second block may be
more proﬁtable than being the observer, players may try to avoid
becoming the next observer. When observers actively select al-
truistic players, players have incentives to display cooperative
acts and hide noncooperative acts in contributing as well as in
punishing and giving. It may pay to use the costly option of
closing the window to hide noncooperative acts. Thus, the game
yields the potential for a conﬂict of interest between the observer
and the players: The observer tries to identify the most co-
operative players as coplayers for the second block, and selﬁsh
players may try to earn as many points as possible but minimize
the risk of being removed from the player group for the next
block by hiding selﬁsh decisions from the observer. In turn, the
observer may try to discover what players try to hide.
Results
Remarkably, only 12 of the 24 observers (two in SPG, six in
PG&PUN, and four in PG&IR) opted for a random determina-
tion of the next observer. The remaining 12 observers incurred
the cost of active selection. The likelihood of an observer’s ac-
tively selecting her coplayers for the second block is inﬂuenced
positively by the difference between the lowest and the second-
Fig. 1. Course of each round in PG&PUN. After round 15 the observer in the ﬁrst block (rounds 1–15) becomes a player. She may select her coplayers for the
second block (rounds 16–30), a choice that costs her 1/2, i.e. 0.5, points, or she may opt for random determination of players, an option hat involves no cost.
The player from the ﬁrst block who is not chosen as a player in the second block becomes the observer in the second block. Each round of the second block
follows the same scheme as in block 1.
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lowest average contributor (z = 2.54, P = 0.011, probit re-
gression in Table 1, Column A). If this difference is high, the
most uncooperative player of the ﬁrst block is distinctively more
uncooperative than the remaining three players. The higher this
difference, the more likely the observer is to incur the cost of
actively selecting her coplayers. The observer’s decision for an
active selection does not seem to be inﬂuenced by the overall
contribution level (z = −1.04, P = 0.300), the variance in con-
tributions (z = −1.58, P = 0.115), or the spread between the
contributions of the three most cooperative players (i.e., the
difference between the highest and the second-lowest contribu-
tor of the ﬁrst block; z= 0.62, P= 0.533) (all values are from the
probit regression in Table 1, Column A).
In PG&PUN observers also may consider the players’ pun-
ishment behavior in making the selection decision. Only 6.7% of
the punishment acts were directed toward higher contributors
(“antisocial punishment”). Thus, punishment was used almost
always to “discipline” low contributors and free-riders. Re-
markably, neither the difference between the highest and the
second-highest punisher (z = 0.84, P = 0.402) nor the difference
between the lowest and the second-lowest punisher (z = 1.75,
P = 0.079) seems to be a criterion for opting active selection
(probit regression in Table 1, Column B), although observers
could have used this criterion in seven of the eight groups (in one
group no punishment was used). Again, active selection was
inﬂuenced positively by the difference between the second-low-
est and the lowest contributor (z = 2.49, P = 0.013). When this
difference is low, observers seem neither to prefer nor to avoid
having high punishers in their group (Fig. 2A); when this dif-
ference is high, however, they exclude the lowest contributor
(Fig. 2B). We can double the sample size by including data from
a companion study (SI Methods) and conﬁrm the nonsigniﬁcance
of the punishment behavior for observers’ selection decisions on
the basis of 16 independent groups in PG&PUN. Here, also,
“antisocial” punishment was negligible (7.0%). Neither the dif-
ference between the highest and the second-highest punisher
(z = −0.360, P = 0.718) nor the difference between the lowest
and the second-lowest punisher (z= −0.340, P= 0.731) seems to
be decisive for active selection (probit regression in Table S1).
Again, active selection was inﬂuenced positively by the differ-
ence between the second-lowest and the lowest contributor (z =
2.93, P = 0.003). Remarkably, active selection by the observer
also was rare in the companion study, occuring in only one of
eight groups. The reason seems to be the higher contribution
levels under the punishment possibility (8.04 ± 0.79 points in the
companion study). Contributions are signiﬁcantly higher in
PG&PUN (8.54 ± 0.41 points) than in SPG (5.74 ± 0.77 points)
(n= 8, z = −2.417, P= 0.016, two-tailed Mann–Whitney U test).
(Fig. S1 presents the data for the companion study that are
presented in Fig. 2 for the present study.)
The four low contributors who were determined as second-
round observers in PG&IR also were the lowest givers. Thus,
observers preferred to remove low contributors, who happened
also to be low givers, as future coplayers from the group.
When observers want actively to exclude highly noncooperative
players from the second block’s play, players may want to hide
noncooperative acts by closing their windows. Indeed, although,
players rarely used the costly option of hiding their contribution
decision (6.11%), they did so when their contribution was low. The
probability of players allowing their activity to be observed (open
window) increasedwith a player’s contribution (probit regression z=
6.52, P < 0.001) (Table S2, Column A), and contributions made
with an open window were signiﬁcantly higher than those made
with a closed window (n = 24; z = −3.703; P < 0.001, two-tailed
Mann–Whitney U test) (Fig. 3A). Players rarely (2.91%) used the
costly option of hiding their punishment decision but did conceal
especially high punishment acts. The probability of players
allowing their acts to be observed decreased with the number of
allocated punishment points (i.e., players punished) (probit re-
gression, z = −3.87, P < 0.001) (Table S2, Column B). In most
cases when players allowed their activity to be observed, no
coplayers were punished (Fig. 3B). Players did not close their
windows preferentially when punishing “antisocially”: The win-
dow was closed in only 10.5% of those cases. Players used the
costly option of hiding their give/not give decision in 4.37% of the
cases and concealed their decisions when not giving (Fig. 3C,
probit regression, z = 2.21, P = 0.027) (Table S2, Column C).
Thus, players hide their activity when making low contributions,
when punishing strongly, and when not giving.
Players’ hiding of low contributions was successful. The con-
tributions that observers saw were higher than those that they did
not see (Wilcoxon two-tailed signed rank matched-pairs test, n =
24, z = −2.808, P = 0.005). Interestingly, the probability of
observers’ concealed watching of a player’s contributions in-
creased with the player’s average contribution that the observer
had observed so far (probit regression z = 2.15, P = 0.032)
(Table S3, Column A). The probability of observing a contribu-
tion decision openly decreased with the average of past con-
tributions observed (probit regression z = −2.68, P = 0.007)
(Table S4, Column A). Thus, observers seemed to aim at
uncovering whether openly high contributors also made high
contributions when not observed openly.
Concealed watching reveals the observers’ focus on coplayers’
behavior: Although observers opted for concealed watching of
contributions and giving/not giving at similar rates, they rarely
used concealed watching for punishment (Fig. 4), indicating their
low interest in observing punishment.
Players were not really successful in duping observers. Al-
though the contributions observers saw were higher than the
contributions that players had made overall (Wilcoxon two-tailed
signed rank matched-pairs test, n = 24, z = −2.138, P = 0.033),
Table 1. Probit regression for the probability of the observer actively choosing the observer of the second block
A B
Coefﬁcient z P Coefﬁcient z P
Average contribution of all players in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1 −0.3439781 −1.04 0.300 −0.0930945 −0.44 0.663
Average variance in contribution of all players in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1 −0.2926371 −1.58 0.115
Difference between the highest and the second-lowest contributor in block 1 −0.3100557 0.62 0.533
Difference between the second-lowest and the lowest contributor in block 1 1.007566 2.54 0.011 0.6602869 2.49 0.013
Difference between the highest and the second-highest punisher in block 1 1.021376 0.84 0.402
Difference between the lowest and the second-lowest punisher in block 1 10.50219 1.75 0.079
Treatment dummy PG&PUN −2.696186 −2.71 0.007
Constant 1.491072 0.46 0.648 0.0356208 0.02 0.984
Phase 1 only; averages over the values the observer actually has seen (either openly or concealed); 24 independent observations; robust SEs; clustered for
independent observations.















the contributions that observers saw correlated positively with all
the contribution decisions of a player (Spearman correlation,
n = 24, ρ = 0.951, P = 0.0001) (Fig. S2A). Similarly, punishment
decisions that observers saw correlated positively with all pun-
ishment decisions (Spearman correlation, n = 8 observed play-
ers, ρ = 0.857, P = 0.007) (Fig. S2B), and give/not give decisions
that observers saw correlated positively with all give/not give
decisions (Spearman correlation, n = 8 observed players, ρ =
0.843, P= 0.009) (Fig. S2C). The observer aimed at selecting the
lowest contributor (and giver) as the next observer. For this se-
lection it is not necessary to observe total contributions quanti-
tatively, which were signiﬁcantly higher when observed than
when unobserved. Therefore the players were able to hide
a signiﬁcant part of their lower contributions from the observer.
However, because observed and unobserved contribution levels
correlated positively, observers could pick the lowest contributor
easily. If total contributions had mattered, observers would have
been misled.
Whom did observers actually select as the next observer? The
probability that a player would be actively selected as the next ob-
server decreased with his openly observed contributions (z=−2.48,
P = 0.013) and his openly observed giving (z = −2.67, P = 0.008).
His openly observed punishment did not inﬂuence the observer’s
decision signiﬁcantly (z= −0.59, P= 0.558). Similarly, neither acts
observed by a concealed observer (z = 0.82, P = 0.413 for con-
tributions and z = 1.06, P = 0.287 for giving) nor the number of
times the observer found a closed window (z=−1.51, P= 0.132 for
contributions) seemed to inﬂuence the observer’s decision (all
values are from probit regression in Table 2). Two observations
seem to be noteworthy. First, observers seemed to focus on the
openly observed contribution and giving behavior when selecting
coplayers for the second block, but punishment activities did not
seem to be decisive. This result nicely complements the previous
analyses that contribution decisions, but not punishment, are de-
cisive for an active selection by the observer. Second, behavior seen
by a concealed observer did not seem to contribute signiﬁcantly to
openly observed behavior in an observer’s selection decision.
Players seemed to use the option of closing the window strategically
to hide low contributions, but when the window was open, they
acted as though they were being observed, either openly or by
a concealed observer. Thus, observers seemed to gain sufﬁcient
information by relying on openly observed behavior.
Discussion
Human subjects avoided as social partners those players who
provided little to a public resource. Accordingly potential part-
ners used the costly option of hiding low contributions from the
observer but openly showed high contributions. They seemed to
hide and reveal decisions strategically to maximize potential
future payoffs. To uncover the players’ true behavior, observers
used targeted observation strategies. Observers directed their
watching to high contributors and even used the costly option of
concealed watching to verify whether the players made the same
decisions when feeling unobserved. Interestingly, although
observers appeared to be on the weaker side in the interaction,
ultimately they rarely were misled when identifying the lowest
contributor. However, observers were accurate only with respect
to a player’s relative position as a contributor in the group.
Observers were misled successfully by the absolute amount of
contributions that they saw. Thus, players managed both to proﬁt
through low contributions to the public good and to show higher
contributions to the observer.
Fig. 2. Determination of the next observer, average of number of coplayers punished, and average contributions of the individual players observed by the
observer in the ﬁrst block. Each symbol represents an individual player and indicates the player’s group. (A) Groups in which the observer opted for a random choice
of next block’s observer. (B) Groups in which the observer actively chose next block’s observer. Circled players are those selected as observers in the next round.
Fig. 3. Players’ decisions with open and closed windows. (A) Percentage of players contributing 0, 5, or 10 units to the public good among players who had
decided to open (Left) or to close (Right) their windows. Data are from SPG, PG&PUN, and PG&IR combined. (B) Percentage of coplayers punished by players
who had decided to open (Left) or to close (Right) their windows. Data are from PG&PUN. (C) Percentage of giving by players who had decided to open (Left)
or to close (Right) their windows. Data are from PG&IR. For statistics, see main text.
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Our results reveal an interaction between observers and ob-
served in seeking to observe and hide social behavior, suggesting
that such interactions also occur in reality whenever these subtle
strategies are both possible and proﬁtable. Players seem to use
the option of hiding low contributions strategically, but when the
window is open, they expect to be observed, either openly or by
a concealed observer. Thus, concealed observations made when
the player’s window was open did not reveal different in-
formation. However, when real-world conditions allow a bigger
toolbox to be used in signaling competitions, further dimensions
of interesting complexity are to be expected. Therefore, in our
study we might have found many fewer concealed interactions
than would be expected under real-life conditions. Our study
may have uncovered only the tip of the iceberg. Social inter-
actions may change in a sophisticated way when the options of
hiding information and concealed observation are possible and
potentially proﬁtable. Studies showing that subjects are more
selﬁsh when anonymous (25–28), especially when the decision
makers believed that the others would evaluate noncooperation
negatively (27, 29, 30), are suggestive of a potential arms race
between observers and observed. Among real-world examples
are political leaders who managed to display a blameless live in
public but had a polygynous sex-life behind “closed windows” in
a race with journalists and paparazzi. The existence of un-
dercover journalists, secret services, and incognito restaurant
reviewers suggests numerous additional examples. Senders may
manipulate many kinds of direct or indirect information [e.g.,
using visual cues, lying, initiating gossip, websites, making don-
ations to charity, showing off]. Peers respond by evaluating ve-
racity at all these levels. Societies have tried to curtail everyday
signaling deceptions (e.g., by placing ever-present watchful eyes
on totem poles or by suggesting that a god “sees through ev-
erything”) (11). Even nonhumans seem to be involved in a
competition of hiding and seeking to obtain information.
Cleaner ﬁsh groom their clients when being watched but bite off
pieces of skin when not observed, and clients may proﬁt from
watching while concealed (31).
Surprisingly, although the players invested effort and money to
conceal their strong punishing behavior, observers completely
ignored whether and how much their future coplayers punished.
A reputation for being a good future coplayer was created by
high contributions. Additional punishment seemed neither to
increase nor diminish a high contributor’s reputation. Two
studies provide hints that punishers achieve a good reputation,
potentially beneﬁcial in a follow-up game (32, 33). Nonetheless,
subjects in our experiment wanted to be anonymous when pun-
ishing severely. They seemed to fear losing their reputations
when severe punishment was observed. However, moralistic
punishment (i.e., punishment of free-riders by a third party) was
lower when the punishment was externally determined anony-
mously than when it was made in front of an audience (34, 35).
This result suggests that the nature of the punishment (either
partially self-serving and directed to coplayers, as in a social-di-
lemma game, or purely altruistic and directed to a third party)
makes a difference in whether anonymity or publicity in pun-
ishing is preferred. Given the widespread and sophisticated use
of costly punishment in social dilemmas (15, 36–42), it is hard to
understand (i) why human subjects obviously ignored this be-
havior when choosing their social partners, (ii) why subjects did
not like to be watched when heavily punishing, and (iii) whether
these results were inﬂuenced by cultural differences in punish-
ment behavior (43).
Methods
One hundred twenty undergraduate students from the University of Erfurt
voluntarily participated in 24 experimental sessions (eight sessions of each of
the three treatments, SPG, PG&PUN, and PG&IR) with ﬁve subjects in each
session. Special care was used to recruit students from many different dis-
ciplines to increase the likelihood that the subjects had never met before.
Each participant was allowed to take part in only one session. Further details
are given in SI Methods.
The four players and the observer playing in the same subject group are,
because of their interaction, statistically dependent observations. The in-
dependent observations for the statistical analyses thus are the groups. The
number of independent observations reported therefore is 24, eight in each
of the three treatments. In nonparametric testing the Mann–Whitney U test
was used for two independent samples, and the Wilcoxon signed rank
matched-pairs test was used for dependent samples. All tests were two-
Table 2. Probit regression for the probability of the observer actively selecting a player as the next observer of the second block
Coefﬁcient z P
Openly observed average contribution of the player in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1 −0.5151949 −2.48 0.013
Concealed observed average contribution of the player in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1 0.0886011 0.82 0.413
Number of times the observer wanted to see the player’s contribution, but the window was closed −0.2088638 −1.51 0.132
Openly observed average punishment of the player in block 1 over the 15 round s of block 1 −0.4840024 −0.59 0.558
Openly observed average giving of the player in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1 −1.837215 −2.67 0.008
Concealed observed average giving of the player in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1 0.4421519 1.06 0.287
Treatment dummy PG&PUN 0.56676 1.08 0.282
Treatment dummy PG&IR 3.996724 2.26 0.024
Constant 2.285591 2.41 0.016
Phase 1 only; averages over the values the observer actually has seen (either open or concealed); 12 independent observations (in which observer opted for
active selection), robust SEs, panel regression, clustered for independent observations. The variables “Concealed observed average punishment of the player
in block 1 over the 15 rounds of block 1,” “Number of times the observer wanted to see the player’s punishment, but the window was closed,” and “Number
of times the observer wanted to see the player’s giving, but the window was closed” were omitted because of colinearity from the original model and
therefore were removed from the regression.
Fig. 4. Actions observers paid to see concealed. Average (+SEM) number of
concealed observations of contributions to the public pool in SPG, of pun-
ishment behavior in PG&PUN, and of giving in PG&IR (two-tailed Mann–
Whitney U test; n1 = 8; n2 = 8; z = −2.235, P = 0.0254).















tailed and were performed over the sessions as the independent observa-
tions. The parametric analyses use robust probit regressions. The regressions
consider individual decisions of all players and deal with dependencies by
clustering for the independent groups. There are two ways in which our
statistics account for the multiple decisions of the players. The ﬁrst way is to
aggregate all decisions of the same type (e.g., all contributions or all pun-
ishment decisions) over the 15 rounds to obtain a single measure (Tables 1
and 2). The second way to deal with the multiple decisions of a player is to
take the decisions in a nonaggregated form and control for the time trend
in the decisions by including an independent variable “period” in the re-
gression (Tables S2–S4).
Statistical analysis was performed with the software package Stata 2009
Stata Statistical Software Release 11 (StataCorp LP).
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